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Abstract
We do two things in this paper. First, we
present a model of possible causes for request-
ing clarifications in dialogue, i.e., we classify
types of non-understandings that lead to clar-
ifications. For this we make more precise the
models of communication of (Clark, 1996) and
(Allwood, 1995), relating them to an indepen-
dently motivated theory of discourse seman-
tics, SDRT (Asher and Lascarides, 2003). As
we show, the lack of such a model is a prob-
lem for extant analyses of clarification moves.
Second, we combine this model with an ex-
tended notion of “confidence score” that com-
bines speech recognition confidence with dif-
ferent kinds of semantic and pragmatic confi-
dence, and argue that the resulting processing
model can produce a more natural clarification
and confirmation behaviour than that of current
dialogue systems. We close with a descrip-
tion of an experimental implementation of the
model.
1 Introduction
It is widely accepted that it would be desirable for dia-
logue systems to be able to produce and understand the
whole range of Clarification Requests (CRs) that can be
found in human-human dialogue, as exemplified in the
following:
(1) a. A: I talked to Mary-Ann Parker-Tomlison.
B: Parker-WHO?
b. A: Well, I’ve seen him.
B: Sorry, you have or you haven’t?
c. A: Did you talk to Peter?
B: Peter Miller?
d. A: Did you bring a 3-5 torx?
B: What’s that?
A precondition for fulfilling this desideratum is a de-
tailed analysis of the communication problems that lead
to the need for clarification. As we show in this paper,
extant approaches to CR do not satisfy this precondi-
tion. We propose that a good starting-point for devel-
oping a more general analysis is a multi-levelled model
of communication along the lines of (Clark, 1996) and
(Allwood, 1995), distinguishing (among other things) be-
tween acoustic understanding and semantic understand-
ing.1 We explore such a model from the perspective
of generating and interpreting CRs, making the central
concepts of the model precise by relating it to an inde-
pendently motivated model of discourse semantics called
SDRT (Asher and Lascarides, 2003).
Deciding on whether to produce CRs is part of the
Confirmation Strategy (CS) of a dialogue system (cf.
(San-Segundo et al., 2001), inter alia). An explicit con-
firmation of an understanding can be sought via a CR,
whereas implicit confirmation can be sought by display-
ing the system’s understanding:
(2) a. Explicit confirmation: “Did you say you
want to leave from Potsdam?”
b. Implicit confirmation: “From Potsdam. To
where?”
Current dialogue systems base their decision on the CS
to follow only on their confidence in the speech recogni-
tion results. It would be desirable, however, if they could
clarify or confirm other hypotheses as well, for example
about reference resolution, depending on their confidence
1Several recent papers (Gabsdil, 2003; Larsson, 2003) have
followed a similar approach, but with a somewhat narrower fo-
cus. (Gabsdil, 2003) is mostly concerned with CRs reacting to
speech recognition, while (Larsson, 2003) offers a similar, but
less fine-grained classification and deals more with integrating
CRs into a specific kind of dialogue management strategy.
in that resolution:
(3) User: Send the file to Peter.
System a: Do you mean Peter Miller?
System b: Will send the file to Peter Miller. Any-
thing else?
Moreover, confidences on different levels of processing
should be allowed to interact. In a situation where the
speech recogniser cannot decide between the hypotheses
“Sandy” and “Andy” for a certain input, but where the
former proper name can be resolved to a more salient dis-
course referent than the latter, a dialogue system should
ideally prefer the former hypothesis and choose implicit
confirmation (variant A below), rather than explicitly
clarifying which alternative to choose (variant B):
(4) User: Send the file to {Sandy | Andy}.
Sys a: To Sandy, OK.
Sys b: Did you say Sandy or Andy?
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Af-
ter presenting an initial classification of CRs and dis-
cussing extant approaches in the next section, we propose
in Section 3 a model of causes for requesting clarification.
Building on this theoretical model we turn in Section 4 to
extending the concept of confidence in a hypothesis in or-
der to produce the CS behaviour sketched above. We also
discuss initial findings from an experimental implemen-
tation of this idea.
2 Clarification Requests
2.1 A First Classification
The examples in (1) above together with (5) below il-
lustrate the wide range of CRs that can occur in dia-
logues, varying with respect to their form (from con-
ventional forms (5-a) to full sentences ((1-d),(5-c-i) and
(5-c-ii)), to sentential fragments ((1-a),(1-b),(1-c),(5-b-i)
and (5-b-ii))) and with respect to their function (clarify-
ing acoustic understanding ((5-a) and possibly those in
(1)); reference ((1-c),(1-d),(5-b-ii) and possibly (1-a) and
(5-b-i)); or pragmatic impact (the examples in (5-c))).
(5) a. A: Did you talk to Peter?
B: Sorry? / Pardon? / You what?
b. (i) A: Did you bring a 3-5 torx?
B: A what?
(ii) A: George Bush is in hospital.
B: Junior or senior?
[from (Gabsdil, 2003)]
c. (i) A: What time is it?
B: Do you want to leave?
(ii) A: Can you pass me the salt?
B: Is that a question or a request?
What the questions in these examples have in common
is that, unlike “normal” questions, they are not about the
state of the world in general, but rather about aspects of
previous utterances: they indicate a problem with under-
standing that utterance, and they request repair of that
problem. We take this to be the defining features of CRs.
Note that this definition includes correctional uses of CRs
as illustrated in (6); in this case the problem is taken to
originate on the side of the speaker of the original utter-
ance rather than on the side of the CR initiator.
(6) a. A: Dear police men....
B: Police men?
A: Alright then, police people.
b. Student: 3 + 4 = 8
Teacher: 3 + 4 = 8?
We will focus on the possible functions of CRs in this pa-
per, leaving the question of how to map CR form to that
function to further work.2 We simply observe at this point
that some CRs indicate the kind of understanding prob-
lem that occurred; e.g., in (1-c) and (5-b-ii) this seems
to be a problem with identifying the intended referent;
in (1-d) and (5-b-i) a lexical problem; in (5-c) a problem
with recognising the intention behind the utterance. This
observation will form the basis of the classification devel-
oped below in Section 3, where we further develop extant
models to make the pre-theoretic notion of understanding
precise.
Contrasting (1-c) and (5-b-ii) with (7) below illustrates
another dimension for classification. Where the former
two CRs ask for a confirmation of a hypothesis, the latter
asks for a repetition (or reformulation) of the problematic
element.
(7) A: I talked to Shanti.
B: WHO?
We call this dimension severity; this represents the intu-
ition that a problem that leads to a request for repetition
is more severe than one that leads to a request for con-
firmation; we will make this notion of severity precise in
Section 4. Note that a confirmation request can be re-
alised as an alternative question, as in (5-b-ii) and (4) b,
or as a y/n-question, as in (1-c).
Lastly, we also distinguish between CRs that point out
a problematic element in the original utterance, and those
that don’t. The former category is illustrated by the CRs
in (1) and (5-b), the latter by those in (5-a) and (5-c). We
call this dimension extent.3
2(Purver et al., 2001) investigates such a mapping, based on
the classification discussed below in Section 2.2.
3The dimensions for classification introduced here are re-
lated to, but different in some aspects from those used in (Lars-
son, 2003). Our term ‘CR’ covers what Larsson calls negative
feedback as well as what he calls checking feedback, whereas
Before we finally come to the description of the di-
mension level of understanding in the next Section, we
will briefly look at an earlier analysis of CR that does not
make these distinctions.
2.2 Previous Analyses
In a number of papers (Ginzburg and Cooper, 2001;
Purver et al., 2001), Jonathan Ginzburg and colleagues
have developed an influential analysis of CR. The authors
define two readings that can be ascribed to CRs, which
they name the constituent reading and the clausal read-
ing.4 (8-b) shows paraphrases of these readings for the
CR in (8-a).5
(8) a. A: Did Bo leave? — B: Bo?
b. clausal: Are you asking whether Bo left?
constituent: Who’s Bo?
These readings are defined informally by (Ginzburg and
Cooper, 2001) (henceforth G&C) as follows: the clausal
reading “takes as the basis for its content the content of
the conversational move [≈ speech act, D.S.] made by
the utterance being clarified. [It] corresponds roughly to
‘Are you asking / asserting that X?’, or ‘For which X are
you asking / asserting that X?’.”; the constituent reading
is a reading “whereby the content of a constituent of the
previous utterance is being clarified.”
Let’s look at the conditions under which a dialogue
participant (be that a dialogue system or a human) might
intend one or the other reading. We begin with the situa-
tion shown in (9-a), taken from G&C.
(9) a. A: Did Bo leave? — B: Who?
b. clausal: For which x are you asking
whether x left?
constituent: Who’s Bo?
severity gives a finer classification of what he calls ‘eliciting
feedback’. Larsson gives a classification comparable to our ex-
tent dimension only indirectly, via a classification of the forms
used to express CR as syntactically fragmental or complete;
however, since syntactically complete utterances can neverthe-
less target individual elements (“Which Peter are you talking
about?”), these categorisations are not congruent.
4They also mention that a third reading might be needed,
namely a lexical reading in which “the surface form of the ut-
terance is being clarified, rather than the content of the conver-
sational move. This reading therefore takes the form ‘Did you
utter X?’.” (Purver et al., 2001). However, the authors do not
offer a formalisation of this reading, so we will concentrate on
the two readings for which they do.
5These readings are realised technically by a straightforward
formalisation of these paraphrases in an HPSG framework, us-
ing an illocutionary-act relation for the clausal reading and a
relation content for the clausal readings, where both relations
take signs as arguments. Since the formalisation is so close to
the paraphrases (and is in any case not backed up by a formal
semantics of the predicates used), we can use in the following
arguments just the paraphrases without missing crucial details.
It seems that the clausal reading is appropriate both in
situations where A failed to recognise the name acous-
tically as well as when she failed to resolve the refer-
ence. An answer to this question will always resolve both
kinds of problems; i.e., this reading does not make a dif-
ference between these kinds of understanding problems.
The constituent reading, on the other hand, does, and is
only appropriate for repetition requests targeting the se-
mantic/pragmatic problem ‘reference resolution.’
The next example, also from G&C, shows a CR that
has the form of a reformulation of the original con-
tent. In this case a constituent reading is not available
in G&C’s analysis, since they postulate a phonological-
identity condition for constituent readings which is vio-
lated here.
(10) a. A: Did Bo leave? — B: My cousin?
b. clausal: Are you asking whether my cousin
left?
constituent (not allowed by G&C): Is the
denotation of “my cousin” the denotation of
“Bo”?
However, in this example the intended distinction be-
tween the readings seems to break down, since the func-
tion of the clausal reading here is to clarify a hypothesis
about the denotation of a referring expression, which in
other cases is the function of constituent readings.
To summarise, G&C’s analysis does not explicitly
record the problem that leads to the need for clarification.
This leads to a loss of information; information which
however will be present on the side of the CR producer
(who knows where the understanding problem occurred)
and presumably should be present on the side of the re-
cipient, who might want to react differently depending
on the assumed problem. It seems that the construct “Are
you X-ing whether p?” is too general to make these fine-
grained distinctions.6
6There is also a technical problem with this analysis, which
can be illustrated with the following example.
(i) A: Can you pass me the salt? — B: The salt?
A’s utterance is of course an example of an indirect speech
act. Since G&C assume that the illocutionary force of the
previous utterance is represented in the CR-reading (“Are you
asking/asserting/etc.-ing whether...”) generated by the grammar,
they have to find a way to capture this indirectness. There are
only two, equally unattractive, options to do this: either the au-
thors have to assume that the grammar directly assigns A’s utter-
ance the force request (rather than question), so that the clausal
reading of B’s utterance can be paraphrased as “Did you request
that I pass the salt?”. But interpreting indirect speech acts is a
highly context-dependent task and not something that can be
decided on syntactical grounds alone. The other option is to
stick with the speech act type that is normally associated with
interrogatives, and arrive at a reading that can be paraphrased as
“Are you asking whether I can pass you the SALT?”. This, how-
ever, is presumably in most cases not the right interpretation of
Level Clark Allwood Ginzburg et al.
4 proposal &
consideration
reaction to
main evocative
function
3 meaning & un-
derstanding
understanding clausal reading;
constituent
reading
2 presentation &
identification
perception lexical reading
1 execution & at-
tention
contact
Figure 1: The four basic levels of communication
We now turn to exploring a model that does make these
distinctions.
3 A Model of Causes for Clarification
3.1 The Fundamental Distinctions
Herb Clark (Clark, 1996) and Jens Allwood (Allwood,
1995) independently developed a model of the (hierar-
chically ordered) tasks involved in communication, as
shown schematically in Figure 1.7 (We have also as-
signed the readings defined by G&C to the appropriate
levels in the last column.) This model can serve as a ba-
sis for classifying the function of CRs. For example, the
CRs shown in (11) can be classified as each targeting a
different level according to the model.
(11) a. [You are sitting in a subway train when A
sits down on the seat next to you, talking.
You might say:] Are you talking to me?
b. A: I saw Peter.
B: What did you say? (I didn’t hear you.)
c. A: I saw Peter.
B: Which Peter?
d. A: My mother is a lawyer.
B: Are you trying to threaten me?
The distinctions made by this model, however, are
still fairly coarse-grained. It seems desirable to further
analyse the levels—and especially the third one, that of
‘meaning and understanding”—so as to capture for ex-
ample the difference between the CRs in (12) below. We
will do this in the next section.
(12) a. A: I ate a Pizza with chopsticks the
other day.
B: A Pizza with chopsticks on it?
the CR.
7There are significant differences between these two mod-
els; however, for our purposes the similarities dominate and so
we treat the models as terminological variants; keeping in mind
that we simplify both models considerably.
b. A: Please give me the double torx.
B: What’s a torx?
c. A: Please give me the double torx.
B: Which one?
d. A: Every wire has to be connected to
a power source.
B: Each to a different one, or can it be
the same for every wire?
3.2 A More Fine-Grained Model
How shall we further carve up the level “meaning & un-
derstanding”? One well-known additional distinction that
seems useful is that between literal meaning and speaker
meaning.8 For instance, this distinction is evoked in the
following categorisation given by (Larsson, 2003):
• Semantic Meaning: discourse-independent mean-
ing. E.g. word meanings.
• Pragmatic Meaning: domain-dependent and
discourse-dependent meaning, further split into:
– referential meaning, e.g. referents of pronouns,
temporal expressions;
– pragmatic meaning proper: the relevance of u
in the current context.
This points in the right direction, but still needs to
be made more precise: for instance, what is “relevance”
here? Where do the examples in (12) fit in that schema?
To make these terms precise, and to add fur-
ther distinctions, we have devised a model that is
closely inspired by how the discourse semantics the-
ory SDRT (Asher and Lascarides, 2003) sets up the syn-
tax/semantics/pragmatics interface. In particular, we use
the idea of using semantic underspecification to allow for
“pragmatic intrusion” into the determination of the truth
value of an utterance; where roughly the underspecified
logical form generated by the grammar corresponds to the
(set of) literal meaning(s) of an utterance, and the prag-
matically resolved LF to the speaker meaning. We also
use SDRT’s idea of spelling out contextual relevance as
the need for determining a rhetorical relation with which
to connect a new utterance to the context, and the con-
cept of speech act related goals (SARGs), i.e. goals that
are conventionally connected to certain types of speech
acts.9 (These ideas will be illustrated with examples be-
low in Section 4 when we discuss the implementation.)
This move allows us to say precisely what constitutes an
understanding problem in this model—namely, a failure
to tackle one (or more) of the precisely defined tasks.
8Which goes back at least to Grice’s studies from the 1960s
reprinted in (Grice, 1989).
9In this paper we concentrate on outlining how this theory
could be used to model clarification and leave further formali-
sation for future work.
Level Description
1 establishing contact
2 speech recognition
3a parsing:
3aa recognising all words
3ab determining syntactic structure
3ac determining a unique syntactic structure
3b resolving underspecification:
3ba reference
3bb tense, scope, presuppositions, lexical
ambiguities, etc.
3c contextual relevance, computing the rhetori-
cal connection
4 recognising speaker’s intentions; evaluating
resulting discourse structure
Figure 2: The fine-grained model
The resulting fine-grained model is shown in Figure 2;
the additional levels are further motivated by the exam-
ples of CRs shown in (13), which indicate problems on
each of these levels (the labels refer to the labels of the
(sub-)levels in the figure).10,11
(13) a. 3aa: see e.g. (1-d) or (5-b-i) above, or:
A: Peter kowtowed again.
B: What does “kowtow” mean?
b. 3ab:
A: The cat that the mouse that the flee
bit saw slept.
B: Who did what? Again, please.
c. 3ac:
A: I saw a man with a telescope.
B: What do you mean? Did you see a
man who was holding a telescope,
or did you use a telescope to watch
him?
d. 3ba: see e.g. (1-c), (12-c) above.
e. 3bb: see (12-d) above, or:
A: I went to the bank yesterday.
B: As in “monetary institute”, or in
“going fishing”?
f. 3c:
10Note that despite the rather technical names for the levels
this is still a theoretical model of the process of understanding—
one, however, that could be implemented in a dialogue system
(see (Schlangen et al., 2001) or Section 4 below). Note also
that we do not want to make any claims about the psychological
status of these postulated levels. All we claim here is that these
levels (which are independently motivated in SDRT) are useful
for distinguishing types of CRs.
11These CRs are not necessarily very natural sounding; the
point is just that one can construct CRs that target exactly those
postulated levels. The examples are presented here to theo-
retically motivate those levels. We are currently conducting a
detailed corpus analysis to determine the coverage that can be
achieved with this model.
[At court, A being a witness and B the
judge.]
A: Max fell. John pushed him.
B: Witness, do you mean that he fell
because he was pushed by the de-
fendant?
g. 4:
(i) A: My mother is a lawyer.
B: Are you trying to threaten me?
B′: Why are you telling me that?
B′′: What do you want to say with that?
(ii) A: Let’s meet next week.
B: My parents in law are visiting
on Tuesday.
A: So are you saying that Tues-
day is good or bad?
To summarise what we have done so far, we have
shown a model that can distinguish in a fine-grained
manner possible problems during the processing (“under-
standing”) of an utterance which can lead to the need for
clarification.12 This models one of the dimensions for
classification which we described in Section 2. What re-
mains to be done is to explain how the problems at each
level can be of different severity, leading to either repeti-
tion or confirmation requests. This we will do in the next
section, where also a general strategy for dealing with
processing hypotheses will be discussed.
4 Clarification Strategies
4.1 Extending the Concept of Confidence Scores
In current spoken dialogue systems there is a very domi-
nant source for understanding problems: speech recogni-
tion (SR). Many existing dialogue systems (cf. e.g. (San-
Segundo et al., 2001)) make use of the confidence scores
returned by SR systems together with each recognition
hypothesis. Based on this value the system can decide
whether to reject the hypothesis (which will lead to a
repetition request, e.g. “Can you repeat?”, “Pardon?”),
whether to confirm it (explicitly with a confirmation re-
quest or implicitly), or whether to accept it without gen-
erating explicit feedback. This strategy is represented
schematically in Figure 3, where the different CSs are
distributed over the space of possible confidence values.
The idea we want to explore here is very straightfor-
ward: this concept of confidence score should be ex-
tended to all levels of processing. At all processing
stages where the system has to rely on “guesses” (non-
monotonic inferences, heuristics, etc.), it should assign
a confidence value to its hypothesis. These confidence
12This model is backed up by an independently-motivated
formal semantic theory, which however for reasons of space we
cannot present here in any detail; cf. (Asher and Lascarides,
2003) for this.
Reject Confirm Accept
(= Rpt. Request)
expl. impl.
(= Cnfrm. Req.)
Figure 3: Confirmation Strategies
values should then be combined in some principled way
(for example by taking a weighted average), to determine
the Confirmation Strategy (repetition or confirmation re-
quest, implicit confirmation, acceptance) and the level of
processing that is to be indicated as the primary source of
the problem.13
In the simplest case, a system should be able to delay
its decision on a CS until processing of (a certain num-
ber of) the hypotheses is completed. For example, imag-
ine the case of a travel information system based in the
UK. This system might be able to offer flights to Boston
(and so should be able to recognise the input “Boston”),
but it also knows that there are no trains from the UK to
Boston. So in this case it should be able to make a deci-
sion for one of the hypotheses in the following example.
(14) Sys: Hello. This is TravelUK. How may I help?
User: I want to go to {Brighton | Boston} by train.
The strategy to make use of combined confidence scores
could be implemented in many different systems; for ex-
ample even the rather simple technique of reference res-
olution via salience lists has an inherent quantitative ele-
ment that could be used. However, to make the idea more
precise, we will in the next section describe an experi-
mental implementation of it in a dialogue system that fol-
lows the approach to discourse interpretation described in
the previous section. Such a system should ultimately be
able to produce the whole range of CRs according to the
dimension level of processing as discussed in Section 3.2
as well as along the dimension severity.
4.2 An Experimental Implementation
So far we have said very little about how the theory of
discourse semantics alluded to in Section 3.2 tackles its
various tasks. In a nutshell, the theory SDRT can be seen
as a combination of dynamic semantics (e.g., DRT, (Kamp
and Reyle, 1993)) plus (AI-based) pragmatics. In con-
trast to traditional dynamic semantics, SDRT attempts to
represent the pragmatically preferred interpretation of a
discourse. The central notion of Discourse Update is for-
13This is a generalisation of the approach taken for example
by (Walker et al., 2000), who use the output of the semantic and
pragmatic modules of their dialogue system to dramatically im-
prove the classifier that judges whether a SR hypothesis is cor-
rect or not, compared to a classifier that just uses SR-features.
mulated in SDRT within a precise nonmonotonic logic,
in which one computes the rhetorical relation (or equiv-
alently, the speech act type) which connects the new in-
formation to some antecedent utterance. This speech act
places constraints on content and the speech act related
goals or SARGs; these in turn serve to resolve semantic
underspecification. Note that those SARGs are goals that
are either conventionally associated with a particular type
of utterance or are recoverable by the interpreter from the
discourse context; this distinguishes the goals that inter-
act with linguistic knowledge from goals in general.
The implementation of the theory which we extended
for this paper, RUDI (Schlangen et al., 2001; Schlangen,
2003), works in the domain of appointment scheduling
(we will refer to the extended version as RUDIclar). It
focuses on resolving one particular kind of underspeci-
fication, namely that arising from the need to “bridge”
definites to their context. To give an example, for (15)
the system computes that the “Wednesday afternoon” is
‘bridged’ via the relation ‘next’ to the time of utterance:
(15) A: What is a good time for you in the next
couple of weeks?
B: Wednesday afternoon would be good.
It does this by non-monotonically inferring the rhetori-
cal relation connecting the second to the first utterance
(Question-Answer Pair), and using constraints on this re-
lation (roughly, times mentioned in the answer must over-
lap with that from the question) to resolve underspeci-
fication. Before we further describe how the algorithm
works, however, we give a couple of examples illustrat-
ing the clarification behaviour of the system.14
Example (16) shows an input where the SR compo-
nent offers two hypotheses that both have to be consid-
ered.15 Let’s assume that there is no salient Monday
the 13th given the dialogue context. In such a situation
we want the system to dramatically lower its confidence
in the Monday hypothesis, leading to a situation where
only the Sunday hypothesis will have to be confirmed,
and only implicitly, rather than having to clarify both hy-
potheses.
14We should stress that RUDIclar is a proof-of-concept im-
plementation of the model presented here and not a proper di-
alogue system. Neither is the system actually connected to a
speech recogniser—we simulate this by annotating the input
with confidence scores—nor does it generate the clarification
forms shown in the examples—rather it produces abstract in-
structions of the form “confirm element x”, “request repetition
of element y” etc. which could be used in such a generation.
Moreover, RUDI models an overhearer of a conversation, not an
actual participant. In RUDIclar this is an overhearer that barges
in if it feels the need to clarify something.
15At present the system can only handle two alternative hy-
potheses, where only one constituent may differ.
→ mrs2di → avail
attach
→ choose → avail
antec
→
speech
acts
→ sa cnstr → sarg → resolve → clarify → update →
Figure 4: Schematic Overview of RUDIclar
(16) A: I’m free on {Sunday 〈55〉| Monday 〈45〉} the
13th.
Example (17) brings in combined confidence values in
a more subtle way.
(17) A: Let’s meet this weekend.
B: How about {Sunday 〈57〉| Monday 〈43〉}?
Here it is not the case that one hypothesis is ruled out
completely; the difference between the hypotheses here is
that one is ‘costlier’ to maintain. In our approach the dia-
logue “Let’s meet next weekend. – How about Monday?”
is just about coherent, under a reading where the second
utterance indirectly corrects the plan (a more explicit ver-
sion of this would be “How about Monday instead?”).
This speech act (Plan-Correction), however, is inferred
in RUDIclar with a much lower confidence than the more
direct speech act Plan-Elaboration that is computed for
the Sunday-variant of B’s utterance. Hence, the system
prefers that latter variant and proceeds accordingly.
The previous examples combined an ambiguity intro-
duced by the SR module with confidence scores from fur-
ther levels. However, new ambiguity can also arise dur-
ing these latter processing stages. In (18) the temporal
expression in B’s utterance cannot be uniquely resolved
(and in this sense the utterance is actually slightly inco-
herent, since it violates the uniqueness presupposition of
definites), and so the system has to clarify the intended
reference.
(18) A: Let’s meet this weekend.
B: How about at 3pm?
RUDI: 3pm on Saturday or 3pm on Sunday?
The last example, (19), shows another source for quan-
tified hypotheses: resolving any temporal expression
other than “tomorrow” to the next day is dispreferred in
the system, and so its confidence in this resolution is low-
ered and it has to be clarified.
(19) A [on a Friday]: Let’s meet this weekend.
B: How about Saturday?
RUDI: You mean tomorrow?
We now sketch how the system works. Reflecting the
modularity of the underlying theory, RUDI(clar) divides
the update process into several stages (shown schemati-
cally in Figure 4). The initial module mrs2di postpro-
cesses the semantic representation provided by the gram-
mar, for example by including underspecified bridging re-
lations for definites. RUDIclar allows logical forms to be
annotated with confidence values (following an approach
similar to that of (Gabsdil and Bos, 2003), associating the
confidence values with labels in an underspecified LF),
and it allows alternative hypotheses as input (only two at
present). In this way we can represent in the system a
situation where the speech recogniser cannot make a de-
cision, as in (16) or (17) above.
At the next stage, an utterance in the context is chosen
to which the current one can be attached via a rhetorical
relation, and this in turn determines which antecedents
for bridging are available. (Should this choice turn out
to lead to failure in successive modules, the system can
backtrack and choose another attachment site.) The
speech act(s) of the current utterance is (are) then inferred
non-monotonically (if there is more than one hypothe-
sis coming from the previous step, this is done for each
of them) from information about the antecedent and the
current utterance and axioms for each relation. The next
module, sa cnstr, tests whether certain constraints on
the meaning of the speech acts are satisfied by the ut-
terances that are being connected. After this, the SARGs
are computed and any remaining underspecification is re-
solved.
Finally, a new module clarify compares (if there is
more than one) and scores the hypotheses, assigning
scores for the bridging decisions and for the speech-act
inferences. Some of the rules used here are shown in
Figure 5. A weighted average is computed, and, based
on the resulting score, the module decides on whether to
launch into a clarification sub-dialogue, and if so, which
clarification strategy to follow. (We set the thresholds for
this and the weights for the average manually to achieve
the behaviour described here; see discussion below.) The
level at which RUDIclar targets the clarification is always
the lowest one where there was a problem; i.e., where al-
ternative hypotheses were introduced, or where no result
could be computed. For instance, in (17) this would be
the SR level rather than the speech act level.
This system is capable of producing flexible CRs that
adapt to the dialogue context, and this shows the value
of the idea of modelling in a fine-grained way sources of
CRs and of extending the concept of confidence scores.
However, the system is only a first proof-of-concept, and
we discuss possible improvements in the next section.
5 Conclusions and Further Work
We have presented a model of causes for requesting clar-
ifications in dialogues. We classified these causes—
BR1 If two (or more) hypotheses are bridged via
‘next’ to same antecedent, closer is better.
BR3 Tomorrow should be referred to as ‘tomor-
row’.
RR1 If there are hypotheses where Plan-Corr has
been inferred (non-monotonically) and some
where other relations have been inferred, pre-
fer these other hypotheses.
Figure 5: Some of the scoring rules
understanding problems in the widest sense—according
to the level of processing on which they arise, and ac-
cording to the severity of the problem. To make this pre-
cise, we related the multi-level models of communication
of (Clark, 1996) and (Allwood, 1995) to the discourse se-
mantics theory SDRT (Asher and Lascarides, 2003), and
arrived at a fine-grained model of different understand-
ing tasks which was motivated by analysing examples of
CRs. We then proposed to extend the notion of confi-
dence score from speech recognition to other kinds of
processing (semantic and pragmatic), and sketched an
implementation of this idea. We think that the resulting,
relatively natural clarification behaviour shows that this
idea of using ‘pragmatic confidences’ is promising.
However, the initial results also suggest that there is
a lot of further work to be done. Firstly, it turned out
during development of the system that setting the thresh-
olds in the system manually in such a way that the de-
sired behaviour was produced was rather hard (besides
being ad hoc). We are currently exploring techniques to
automatically learn the best settings from a corpus (this
could perhaps be done along the lines of (Walker et al.,
2000)). Secondly, the system we extended, RUDI, makes
rather high demands on the quality of the data, being a
system that relies on ‘deep processing’ at all stages. We
are currently exploring ways of implementing the idea
of using confidence values throughout in ‘simpler’, more
realistic dialogue systems. This is a precondition for a
thorough evaluation of the proposed clarification strategy,
using ‘real-world’ criteria like user satisfaction and dia-
logue duration until task-completion.
With regard to the theoretical analysis of CRs, we are
currently testing the coverage and accuracy of the model
in a corpus study, and we are also working on a proper
formalisation of the different classes of CR we proposed,
in the framework of SDRT.
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